The Supreme Court recently handed down its highly anticipated judgment in Canada Square Operation Ltd v Potter [2023] UKSC 41. The case considered the meaning of 鈥渄eliberately concealed鈥 and 鈥渄eliberate commission of a breach of duty鈥 in the context of section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 (the Act).
Background
Mrs Potter took out a loan and a PPI Policy in 2006 with Canada Square. She was not informed that Canada Square would receive 95% of the policy鈥檚 premium as commission.
The loan agreement came to an end in March 2010 and in November 2018 Mrs Potter was informed of the commission. She brought a claim to recover the sums she had paid on the basis of a failure to disclose the commission, which resulted in the relationship being unfair under section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
Canada Square argued that as the six-year limitation period under the Act had expired, a claim could not be brought. Mrs Potter relied on section 32(1)(b) and 32(2) of the Act arguing that the limitation period did not run until she learned of the commission.
Under section 32(1)(b) of the Act, where any fact relevant to the claimant鈥檚 pleading of a claim has been 鈥渄eliberately concealed鈥 by the defendant, the limitation period will not run. Furthermore, section 32(2) states that 鈥渄eliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty鈥.
Judgement
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Canada Square鈥檚 appeal. The court considered the meaning of 鈥渃oncealed鈥 and 鈥渄eliberately鈥 including whether 鈥渄eliberately鈥 could also mean 鈥渞ecklessly鈥.
Lord Reed stated that 鈥渄eliberately鈥 and 鈥渃oncealed鈥 would be given their ordinary meanings. Deliberate concealment could be understood as keeping 鈥渁 secret from the claimant, either by taking active steps to hide it or by failing to disclose it鈥. However, Lord Reed rejected the notion that 鈥渄eliberately鈥 could also mean 鈥渞ecklessly鈥 in this circumstance. Therefore, the defendant鈥檚 concealment does not extend to reckless intention.
Departing from the previous Court of Appeal decision, the claimant is not required to show that the defendant had a moral or social duty to disclose the information. They also do not have to show that the defendant was aware that the fact was relevant for the claimant鈥檚 cause of action.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument of 鈥渄eliberate commission of a breach of duty鈥 under section 32(2) on the basis that it had not been demonstrated that Canada Square intended its failure to disclose to result in the relationship鈥檚 unfairness under section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Despite this, the appeal was dismissed as section 32(1)(b) was fulfilled.
Comment
As Canada Square v Potter was a test case, there will likely now be an increase in the number of PPI claims that were previously considered to be time barred. There are currently approximately 26,000 similar and active claims that may be impacted by this decision. This judgment could also have wider significance to undisclosed commission cases where similar scenarios arise.
However, the flurry of cases might be limited due to the previous landmark case of Plevin v Paragon Finance Limited [2014] UKSC 61 which also dealt with undisclosed commissions and PPI. The parties in Potter did not consider 鈥榙iscovery of the relevant fact鈥 through reasonable diligence. However, due to 笔濒别惫颈苍鈥檚 high media coverage, banks could argue that claims issued from 2020 onwards should remain time barred as through reasonable diligence as they could have discovered the concealment. We doubt this is the last we have heard of the PPI mis-selling saga.